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NOTES
EPISTEMOLOGICAL NONSENSE?
THE SECULAR/RELIGIOUS DISTINCTION
CHRISTINE L. NILES*
One of the most contentious debates today involves the role
of religious reasoning in the public square of law and politics.
Some worry over the thought of allowing religious reasoning in
public debate, and advocate a "privatized religion" theory in
which religion is confined to the private realm. According to this
line of thought, secular reasons should prevail in public discus-
sion as such reasons are universally accessible by way of being
more rational, neutral and inclusive of many truths. Others
desire a middle way, in which religion should at least play a
muted part in public discourse. For example, Kent Greenawalt
argues that religious reasoning is only appropriate in the public
sphere when secular reasoning fails to resolve an issue.1 Finally,
others such as Michael Perry advocate the full and robust partici-
pation of the religious in politics and law.2 This line of reasoning
holds that religion as a worldview encompasses all aspects of life,
and artificially separating religion between the public and private
spheres not only makes little sense, it is impossible.
The first task of philosophy involves questioning assump-
tions. Each person holds beliefs never analyzed, but simply taken
for granted. In law, it is especially important to examine presup-
positions in order to understand and apply legal concepts prop-
erly. When it comes to Establishment Clause jurisprudence, all
roads lead to the secular/religious distinction. Although argu-
ments over the role of religion in the public square support dif-
ferent conclusions, they each start from one unquestioned
* J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2003; White Scholar, Thomas
J. White Center on Law and Government, 2001-2003; M.St., Theology, Oxford
University; B.A., Philosophy, University of Florida.
1. Kent Greenawalt, Religion and American Political Judgments, 36 WAKE FOR-
EST L. REv. 401, 411 (2001).
2. See, e.g., MICHAEL PERRY, LorE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND
MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991).
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premise: namely, that the distinction between religion and secu-
larism is a valid and coherent one. This Note argues that the
secular/religious distinction, from which so much Establishment
Clause jurisprudence springs, is epistemologically incoherent.
Secularism, which prides itself on being rational, neutral, and
non-exclusionary, no more attains these virtues than the most
ardent sectarianism.
By analyzing the epistemological underpinnings of secular-
ism, this Note will show that no coherent line separates the "secu-
lar" from the "religious." This Note concludes that a more
accurate Establishment Clause jurisprudence will understand the
nature of this distinction, and, in an effort to provide a princi-
pled method of application, courts should define the terms pre-
cisely and apply them consistently. Courts have yet to clearly
define secularism or religion, failing to set clear parameters that
can be followed by later courts. As a result, we are left with a
confusing body of case law that fails to clarify the very terms on
which all else depends.
I. BACKGROUND
A brief sketch of the progress of philosophical thought
might prove a useful backdrop to this discussion. It is difficult to
sum up the last three centuries without gross oversimplification,
but the following outline should prove relatively accurate. Some
of the strongest influences on early American thought came
from the Protestant religion, and Enlightenment Rationalism.
This was the age of the British Empiricists3 and the Continental
Rationalists,4 as well as the intellectuals of France.5 Though
many of the prominent philosophers believed in God,6 and some
considered the Christian Scriptures authoritative, all of them put
an emphasis on the role of reason. Using reason as a tool to cut
away at the less "essential" dogmas of the Church, rationalism was
proposed as an alternative to the mysticism and superstition
often associated with religion. Some used rationalism as a way to
refute arguments previously asserted to prove the existence of
God,' while others formulated rationalist arguments to prove
3. The British Empiricists are generally recognized asJohn Locke, Bishop
George Berkeley, and David Hume.
4. The Continental Rationalists include Renee Descartes, Gottfried
Leibniz, and Baruch Spinoza.
5. Some influential French thinkers of this era are Voltaire, Denis
Diderot, Paul von Holbach, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
6. E.g., Locke, Descartes, Kant, and Leibniz.
7. See, e.g., DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTAND-
INC (1748).
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God's existence.8 Whatever the result, the method was based on
a radical distinction between faith and reason.
The rise of modernism in the nineteenth and twentieth cen-
turies flowed directly from Enlightenment Rationalism. Auguste
Comte and Ernst Mach introduced scientific positivism, an
attempt to categorize all sciences, including the study of human
behavior, into one all-embracing empirical law.' Utilitarians,
includingJeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, proposed a sort
of "thinking man's hedonism," where, through the use of reason,
they concluded that human behavior is motivated by sensations
of pleasure or pain. 1" Their moral philosophy was based on an
ethics grounded in ascertainable facts, rather than hazy intu-
itions." The Pragmatism of Charles Sanders Pierce, William
James, and John Dewey, though composed of different strands of
thought, advocated empirical investigation as the path to objec-
tive truth. Bertrand Russell, laterjoined by the Logical Positivists
of the Vienna Circle, attempted to purify philosophy-and the
essential terms of the language of philosophy-through the
application of logic, desiring the same certainty and precision
inherent in mathematics. 2
The nihilism that followed proclaimed the death of God and
the death of Truth by endorsing man's ability to forge his own
fate through the use of his will.13 Nihilism replaces the idea that
absolute Truth exists with the view that many truths coexist, man
is the center of the universe, the world is at bottom irrational and
absurd, and man must debunk the myths of religion in order to
create his own fate.
14
The nihilism of Nietzsche went hand-in-hand with the exis-
tentialism of Albert Camus15 and Jean-Paul Sartre. 6 Their phi-
8. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PuRE REASON (1748).
9. ERNST MACH, THE ANALYSIS OF SENSATIONS (C.M. Williams trans., Syd-
ney Waterlow ed., Dover Publ'ns 1959) (1886); AUGUST COMTE, COURSE IN POSI-
TIVE PHILOSOPHY (1781).
10. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (David Lyons ed., 1997) (1861);
JEREMY BENTHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLA-
TION (1789).
11. See generally MILL, supra note 10, and BENTHAM, supra note 10.
12. BERTRAND RUSSELL, OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD
(1926).
13. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA: A BOOK FOR
ALL AND NONE 9-12 (Walter Kaufmann trans., ed., 1954) (1883-1885).
14. WALLACE I. MATSON, II A NEW HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 465 (1987).
15. See, e.g., ALBERT CAMUS, THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS AND OTHER ESSAYS
(Justin O'Brien trans., 1955).
16. See, e.g.,JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS: AN EsSAy ON PHE-
NOMENOLOGICAL ONTOLOGY (Hazel E. Barnes trans., 1956).
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losophies consisted of a view of the world consisting
fundamentally of chaos and purposelessness. The absurdity of
existence means that man is free to choose what he is to become,
without the trappings of traditional morality. The death of God
proclaimed by Nietzsche necessarily implied the collapse of the
whole traditional ethical system, a system in his time dominated
by the Judeo-Christian tradition. This traditional morality,
informed by religious values, should be rejected in favor of a
man-made, man-centered morality.17 We are left in a universe
indifferent to our fate, and thus must create our own meaning
and destiny. 8
Despite the seeming extremism of these worldviews, their
influence on academia is pervasive. Indeed, what we know as
"postmodernism" is largely informed by such views. Although
postmodernism is comprised of diverse worldviews, one could
accurately characterize it as a hermeneutics of suspicion. Those
practicing the deconstruction of language, history, literature, sci-
ence, and law believe their work reveals innate power structures
that perpetuate oppression. In other words, language, history,
science, and law do not reveal truth-they are social constructs
created to manipulate and oppress. In the deconstructionist's
mind, it is necessary to subvert the status quo of power latent in all
fields of inquiry in order to bring about equality. 9
As noted, some oversimplification is inevitable when summa-
rizing several centuries of thought in a few paragraphs. How-
ever, the general trends documented are accurate. It is against
this backdrop that we can understand the modem distinction
between the "secular" and the "religious," a distinction that this
Note will argue is deceptive and ultimately incoherent. In order
to understand its folly, the lawyer must become the epistemolo-
gist. This is not the average jurist's field of expertise, but an
understanding of it is essential to a more accurate Establishment
Clause jurisprudence.
Although some may quibble over the definition of secular-
ism, for the purposes of this Note, secularism is generally marked
by three assumptions. First, human reason is the ultimate
authority for the secularist, whereas faith has the final word for
the sectarian. Second, secularism approaches the question of
metaphysics neutrally, unlike "religion," in which bias and
17. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS (Walter
Kaufmann trans., ed., 1967) (1887); FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND
EVIL (Walter Kaufmann trans., ed., 1966) (1886).
18. See, e.g., NIETZSCHE, supra note 13.
19. Critical Legal Theory is one area of such thought, its starting point
being the belief that all law is reducible to power and politics.
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dogma prevail. Finally, secularism leaves room for many truths
to co-exist, whereas religious worldviews require adherence to
absolute and exclusive truth.
This Note will demonstrate that these assumptions are
patently false. First, secularists rely on faith as much as, if not
more than, religious adherents. Secularists are no more capable
of neutrality in their thinking than anyone else. Finally, secular-
ists adhere to their own dogmatic and exclusive view of the world
as much as religious adherents do. The following sections will
examine each of these assumptions in turn.
A. Faith and Reason
The religious have at times been caricatured for being
superstitious and irrational, blindly following divine authority
despite evidence to the contrary. Some Christians believe in
notions generally thought outrageous to the rationalist, who
abides by argument, reason, and evidence. A seven-day creation,
a Garden of Eden, talking serpents, staffs that turn into snakes,
and the resurrection of the dead cannot be demonstrated by sci-
ence or the use of reason, the rationalist argues, and thus he
rejects such notions. The religious man, however, although he
has not seen, believes because of his faith in Scripture and in
God's authority. According to this picture, the man of faith and
the man of reason seem entirely at odds.
It is important here to define exactly what faith is. Faith is,
no more and no less, the reliance on trusted authority. Faith
need not be limited to reliance on divine authority; rather, it can
include reliance on any authority. The child has faith in his par-
ents that they will take care of him. The lover has faith in his
beloved that she will be loyal. The student has faith in his
teacher that what is being taught is accurate. The teacher has
faith that the textbook he teaches from contains correct facts.
The driver has faith that the car he drives has been assembled
correctly. Faith is exercised in almost every aspect of our lives. It
undergirds everything that people take for granted on a daily
basis. Faith is the most common, and most essential, aspect of
practical existence.
This notion is well reflected in the following passage:
[T] here are in the life of a human being many more truths
which are simply believed than truths which are acquired
by way of personal verification. Who, for instance, could
assess critically the countless scientific findings upon which
modem life is based? Who could personally examine the
flow of information which comes day after day from all
2003] 565
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parts of the world and which is generally accepted as true?
... This means that the human being-the one who seeks
the truth-is also the one who lives by belief.
21
Once one understands this, then the yawning gulf between
faith and reason turns out to be a mere crack-if that. The secu-
larist believes to have rejected faith in favor of reason, but on
closer scrutiny turns out to be, at bottom, as dependent upon
faith as any religious person. Sir Karl Popper, the great philoso-
pher of science, has demonstrated the ultimate irrationality of
the worldview that takes human rationalism as its starting point.
21
The rationalist attitude is characterized by the importance
it attaches to argument and experience. But neither logi-
cal argument nor experience can establish the rationalist
attitude; for only those who are ready to consider argu-
ment or experience, and who have therefore adopted this
attitude already, will be impressed by them. That is to say,
a rationalist attitude must be first adopted if any argument
or experience is to be effective, and it cannot therefore be
based upon argument or experience.2 2
In other words, the rationalist must presuppose rationalism
in order to prove rationalism. It turns the entire argument into a
question-begging enterprise. This is true in the case of all induc-
tive and deductive reasoning. The conclusion in deductive rea-
soning assumes the premise, and the rule derived from inductive
reasoning assumes the general rule in the first instance. For
example, if the empiricist challenges the rationalist to prove how
he knows his ultimate authority-rationalism-to be true, the
rationalist might reply, "By the use of Reason." But this begs the
very question he is trying to answer, for he has already presup-
posed rationalism in order to prove rationalism. If he responds
by claiming that experience proves so, he has relied upon empiri-
cism to prove the superiority of rationalism, contradicting him-
self. In the end, the rationalist can only say that Reason's
ultimate authoritativeness is self-evident-which is, at bottom, no
different from simply declaring that his position is so because it is
SO.
The purpose of this exercise is to show that the rationalist
must, in faith, adopt rationalism as his starting point, without
being able to account for rationalism itself. Popper concludes
that, in the end, the rationalist has an "irrational faith in rea-
20. JOHN PAUL II, FIDES ET RATIO: ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FAITH
AND REASON, 43-44 (1998).
21. KARL POPPER, POPPER SELECTIONS 35 (David Miller ed., 1985).
22. Id.
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son." 23 In fact, he has gone so far as to say that " [i] rrationalism is
logically superior to uncritical rationalism." 24 In other words,
those who accept rationalism as their ultimate starting point with-
out realizing that the starting point cannot be proved are in a
worse position intellectually than those who openly embrace
faith as their first principle.
Ludwig Wittgenstein argued along a similar vein in regard to
language and the doubting game. 25 In order for language to
work, certain basic axioms must be assumed without question,
what he termed "indubitables. ' '26 These indubitables are those
beliefs most firmly entrenched in our system of language and
thought. They are not learned one by one, but simply accepted
as a system of interlocking and interconnected axioms by which
our language system is made coherent. They comprise the "rules
of a game" which we call language. 27 Reasoning cannot be made
without the use of language, and therefore all reasoning turns
upon definitions and concepts we have accepted on authority by
those we trust.
One imagines the way a child learns. He must first accept
what his teachers or parents tell him is the case regarding the
world. He does not start by doubting, but accepting facts on
authority. Only later does he begin to question and demand rea-
sons for those facts he has accepted on authority; yet this ques-
tioning can only involve elements within the linguistic
framework. For him to demand rational justification for the
entire framework itself would be moot, for this is precisely where
rational justification ends. Michael Polanyi, the philosopher and
theologian, has noted that an art "can be transmitted only by
examples of the practice which embodies it. He who would learn
from a master by watching him must trust his example. He must
recognize as authoritative the art which he wishes to learn and
those of whom he would learn it."28
In other words, a linguistic system frames the entire rational
enterprise, and to demand justification for the enterprise itself
requires presupposing those elements that are beyond doubt-
elements that have no rational justification per se, but are needed
because all else hangs upon them. These are the foundational
elements that provide coherence to the whole scheme. For
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY (D. Paul & G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H. von Wright eds., 1969).
26. See generally id.
27. Id. § 95.
28. MICHAEL POLANYI, SCIENCE, FAITH AND SOCIETY 15 (1973).
2003]
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example, a linguist who decides to doubt the entire foundation
of language must use the very language he presently doubts. It is
as if the linguist sets out to doubt the whole structure of lan-
guage, but in doing so, forms his analysis according to the words
he has learned from that language. So, obviously, there are ele-
ments of that language that must be presupposed and employed,
elements that cannot be doubted, for they form the bedrock on
which he can doubt at all. Certainly, he may revise parts of the
language, modify or alter certain grammatical rules here and
there-but he cannot revise the entire linguistic framework with-
out employing the very terms used in that linguistic framework.
To put it simply, doubting the whole enterprise is impossible
without presupposing terms learned from the very enterprise in
doubt. "The questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the
fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were
like hinges on which those turn."29 "Doubt itself rests only on
what is beyond doubt."3"
For example, take the scientist, the eminent empiricist. The
scientist's credo is to observe, experiment, prove. However, even
the scientist cannot escape the clutches of authority. All facts
cannot be tested ad infinitum. At some point, the scientist must
accept some facts as simply given.
Take as an illustration the investigator who has read in the
paper that the President has flown to the Himalayas. If he were
to investigate the truth of this claim, he might telephone the
newspaper's headquarters and have a reporter corroborate the
statement. If the investigator were to prod the reporter to ascer-
tain this fact, the reporter might reply that he had called the
White House. The investigator might question how the reporter
knows the White House staff member was not lying. If the
reporter answers that all the other newspapers have reported
that the President has flown to the Himalayas, the investigator
might ask how the other papers know the staff member was not
lying. If not satisfied, the investigator might fly to the Himalayas
himself to find the President in person. Once he sees the Presi-
dent, he might question further whether it is not the President
but a body double.
The purpose of this tedious exercise is to demonstrate that
the quest for rational justifications for every fact leads to an infi-
nite regress. The average man would respond to the investiga-
tor's questions in the illustration above with an exasperated, "It's
just common sense!" This exclamation, however, is no different
29. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 25, § 341.
30. Id. § 519.
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from admitting that at some point further questioning is point-
less. For the sake of practicality, certain claims should be believed
without further empirical justification, and simply accepted on
faith as true. We begin to understand Wittgenstein's claim that
"[g]iving grounds [and] justifying evidence, comes to an end.
"31
In response to this demonstration, the naturalist might con-
cede that he does, to some small degree, exhibit faith by his
acceptance of unsubstantiated facts, simply because, as explained
above, facts cannot be substantiated ad infinitum. Yet he will
counter that there are degrees of faith, and the religious person
exhibits far more faith than the naturalist himself. At least the
naturalist, he will assert, has good grounds for accepting unsub-
stantiated facts-because those same facts have been reliable in
the past. Those facts are something he can depend on, because
they have consistently produced accurate results, whereas the
religious person blindly throws himself upon some occult being
without empirical warrant.
The Christian would claim, however, that his faith in God
rests on perfectly rational justifications, and that his faith is sup-
ported by just as many sound empirical facts as the naturalist's.
The Christian may experience prayer answered again and again
in his life, prayer he believes to have been answered by a faithful
God. He may have experienced God's work in his life manifested
in objective and tangible ways. The seasoned religious person
could eventually come to have faith in God to sustain him
through future trials, as God has already demonstrated his real
presence consistently in the past. Thus, to rely on God in faith is
not an irrational act to the Christian, but a perfectly reasonable
and justified act, based on empirical evidence.
B. Neutrality
The secularist believes that his ability to be neutral in mat-
ters of belief allows him to occupy the high ground above the
sectarian.32 The ground is leveled, however, once the assump-
tion of neutrality is dismantled. As David Novak has so aptly writ-
ten, "The question, then, is not a god or no-god. The question is
whose god."33
It should be understood that each person approaches the
world with his own framework of interpretation. We each wear
31. Id. § 204.
32. Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 30
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 763, 764 (1993).
33. David Novak, Law: Religious or Secular?, 86 VA. L. REv. 569, 594 (2000).
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uniquely tinted glasses, as it were, through which we filter objec-
tive facts. Apart from this filter, i.e., this framework of interpreta-
tion, facts remain unintelligible data. "Brute facts," as Hume
termed them, have no logical interconnection and therefore no
intelligibility. Brute facts are facts as yet uninterpreted. The
traditional understanding is that the human observer gathers
brute facts neutrally, simply compiling more and more brute
facts one on top of the other, like unconnected data about the
world. However, the truer picture is that the human observer
must interpret brute facts to fit within his framework of belief.
Polanyi has observed that reasoning and learning do not
occur fact by individual fact, but take place within an overarching
system of interpretation. Facts are seen "subsidiarily in terms of
their participation in a whole."34 The philosopher of logic W.V.O.
Quine has rejected the notion that beliefs can be acquired piece-
meal, as if individual statements can have their own unique
empirical content apart from other statements. 35 Rather, each
statement is logically bound up with all other statements within
one conceptual scheme apart from which no statement is
coherent, 6
As illustration, think of facts as bricks. The traditional view
of fact-gathering is that of stacking one brick upon an existing
body of bricks. One fact builds upon another fact, and another,
and so on. Each fact is discrete and separate from the others,
and is added on neutrally to a never-ending stack of bricks.
However, modern epistemology has revealed that this is not
the way knowledge is gathered. Rather, consider knowledge now
to be represented by a bubble of plasma. Each new fact is like a
drop added to the bubble, rippling through the plasma until
finally incorporated into the bubble. A new fact must be made to
fit smoothly within the preexisting framework. In other words, a
new fact must be made to make sense according to one's present
understanding of the world, and this necessarily affects other
facts within the bubble. If it does not make sense, the fact-
rather than being molded to fit within the existing bubble-will
be rejected as error or hallucination, and will never become part
of the bubble.
Take as another illustration knowledge represented by a
puzzle, and facts being pieces of the puzzle. The pieces so far
seem to depict a scene of a forest. However, new pieces added
34. MICHAEL POLANVI, KNOWING AND BEING 128 (1969).
35. WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW 20-46
(2d ed. rev. 1961).
36. Id.
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and fitted to the puzzle change the picture from that of a forest
to that of the interior of a house. The new pieces completely
transform one's understanding of the old pieces, so that an
entirely different picture is formed. So it is with facts and knowl-
edge. New facts necessarily have an effect on "old" facts, either
confirming them, or transforming them entirely. They are not
like single bricks stacked on top of each other, static, unchang-
ing, with no transformative effect on one another. Each fact is
part of a whole web of facts, logically interconnected and
interdependent.
An interesting phenomenon that follows from this concept
of epistemology is that the old picture of the puzzle, which one
has for years believed to be a forest, does not die easily. One's
most firmly entrenched beliefs are not discarded simply by a few
contradictory facts-and this applies to the rationalist as well as
to the irrationalist. That is, when a new piece does not corrobo-
rate the picture of the forest, the new piece will be rejected as
error, rather than found a place within the puzzle. Not until a
large number of new pieces consistently contradict the picture of
the forest will the observer reconsider the accuracy of his former
view of the picture. This can only be done through a radical
upheaval, whereby all the old pieces (facts) must be reinter-
preted in light of the new pieces (facts) to form a different pic-
ture (theory of the world).
Thomas Kuhn, the brilliant philosopher of science, has
applied this notion to science.3 7 Contrary to traditional under-
standing, science does not progress in linear fashion, by the
piecemeal accretion of facts. Rather, the history of science is
marked by revolutions.3 8 One conceptual scheme, or paradigm,
is slowly destroyed in favor of another wholly incompatible para-
digm.3 9 When new data in conflict with the present paradigm
are introduced, the scientist does not immediately do away with
the old paradigm to accommodate the new, conflicting data, as
we might expect the "neutral" observer to behave. Rather, the
scientist will do his best to explain away the conflicting data as
37. THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed.
1970).
38. Id. at 128.
39. Id. For instance, our present theory of optics was preceded by numer-
ous contradictory paradigms, each an attempt to explain the nature of light.
Similarly, concepts of electricity differed among scientists in the eighteenth
century, all practicing the same methods of experimentation and observation.
One of the most notable paradigm shifts occurred between classical Newtonian
physics and the introduction of Quantum physics, a theory of the physical uni-
verse that transforms classical understandings of gravity, time, and speed. See id.
at 2-17.
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error, or aberration.4" He will cling to the old paradigm in spite
of contradictory facts, believing in faith that a naturalistic expla-
nation will someday present itself to corroborate the old para-
digm. When enough conflicting facts present themselves, and
enough members of the scientific community are convinced, the
new paradigm begins to replace the old paradigm. This, in
essence, is the structure of scientific revolutions.
Thus, an innate psychologism exists in the scientific enter-
prise such that one cannot deem it purely rational. The scientist
might finally abolish the old paradigm in favor of a new scientific
theory-but it is not done without great resistance. As the puzzle
illustration above demonstrated, our firmly entrenched beliefs
about the world die hard deaths. Quine has termed this phe-
nomenon the maxim of minimum mutilation.4"
Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make
drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system. Even
a statement very close to the periphery can be held true in
the face of recalcitrant experience by pleading hallucina-
tion or by amending certain statements of the kind called
logical laws.4 2
Another thinker has made the radical but cogent argument
that natural science as one's ultimate authority is not established
through the application of scientific method, but taken for
granted, just as the biblicist takes the Bible's authority for
granted." To take an example, science proceeds by inductive
reasoning. One of the rules acquired through inductive reason-
ing is the uniformity of nature-that nature will continue to
operate in the same way as it has in the past. This rule was
acquired through the repeated observation of physical objects
behaving in exactly the same way as they had yesterday, and the
day before, and the day before that, hundreds upon thousands of
times over. Although the scientist cannot see into the future, he
assumes, based on past evidence, that objects will continue to
behave in the same way. There is no logical necessity linking past
and future phenomena.
The great British philosopher David Hume demonstrated
this fact.44 That physical objects have behaved consistently
40. POPPER, supra note 21, at 145.
41. QUINE, supra note 35, at 42.
42. Id. at 43.
43. See GREG L. BAHNSEN, The Problem of Religious Language, in ALWAYS
READY: DIRECTIONS FOR DEFENDING THE FAITH (Robert R. Booth ed., 1992).
44. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 177-82 (Alasdair
Maclntyre ed., 1965) (1739).
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thousands of times in the past does not foreclose the logical possi-
bility of a deviation in behavior in the future. In other words, the
logical possibility always exists for phenomena to change; the sun
might not rise tomorrow, or objects could begin to levitate. This
is implicit in the concept of probability, which is the keystone of
all scientific investigation.
Science has never relied on certainty, but rather on
probability. Probability presupposes what the scientist needs but
can never prove, which is the uniformity of nature. At bottom,
the natural scientist has faith in the hypothesis that the course of
nature will remain uniform, and as proof can only point to exam-
ples of its past uniformity. Of course, this is not proof but mere
question-begging. As previously noted, inductive reasoning
assumes its general rule.
The Christian has faith that God has an overarching and
coherent plan for human existence, that history is the out-
working of that divine plan, and that faith in this divine plan
lends intelligibility to the universe. Empirical evidence buttress-
ing these beliefs include, for example, the love shown in other
human beings, the order and beauty of creation, and the benefi-
cial changes in the believer's own heart and life through adher-
ence to faith. Such empirical evidence demonstrates to the
believer that his faith, as a system of belief, lends intelligibility to
the universe. Apart from such a framework of interpretation, the
universe is unintelligible. Thus, the Christian's faith is no more
blind than, on a lesser level, the naturalist's faith in the uniform-
ity of nature. Both starting points are assumed, and then but-
tressed by empirical facts.
In the political realm, Frederick Gedicks has indicated that
secularists "fail to see how thin the distinction is between knowl-
edge and belief. It never occurs to them that religious claims
might be rational or that secular claims would be irrational."45
As an example, Gedicks examines the nature of election cam-
paigns to demonstrate the irrationalism that pervades politics.46
Campaigns, dominated by political posturing and pithy sound
bites, are structured to draw not on the rational element of vot-
ers' consciousness but rather on the emotive and the psychologi-
cal.4 7 The very members elected to represent the people in a
rational manner are chosen largely through irrational, emotive
means. "If politics as actually practiced falls well short of the
45. Frederick Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. Rv.
671,694 (1992).
46. Id. at 695.
47. Id.
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ideal of critical rationality, and if religious belief is partially based
on reason, on what basis is religion disfavored in political life?"4
This is a question well worth asking the secularist.
At this point one might object that religion has not been
properly defined. We should examine some attempts at defining
religion to see whether a cogent definition is possible. Some
believe religion, for political and legal purposes, should be
defined as including those belief systems that teach the existence
of a supreme Author of the universe, to which one owes obedi-
ence.49 That definition works well for Christianity, Judaism, and
Islam, among others, but it fails to include, for example, Bud-
dhism-unless one claims the unity of all existence to mean God.
But that is quite a stretch, and no one would deny that Buddhism
is a "religion." One might switch tracks and define religion as
including belief systems with fundamentally spiritual teachings.
But the word "spiritual" would have to be defined, and it is diffi-
cult to understand the content of what is "spiritual" apart from
what is "religious," resulting in circular reasoning. One might
then make the defining factor faith. Finally, Buddhism is
included-but so is every other conceivable worldview. As previ-
ously demonstrated, every belief system, whether it be atheism,
materialism, utilitarianism, idealism, etc., involves assuming its
starting point, and thus reasoning in a circle. Ultimate justifica-
tion for each worldview cannot rest on purely rational grounds,
but, as explained above, on faith.
Agnosticism seems to present a special case, because the
agnostic claims to abstain from dogma. Under the magnifying
glass, however, it is not unique after all, for agnosticism is simply
another word for secularism. Agnostics may claim that they do
not know whether certain religious truth claims are true, but they
live as if they know they are not true. For instance, the agnostic
may say that he abstains from deciding whether Christ's lordship
is the only way to eternal salvation, yet he lives in the present as if
Christ is not the only way to salvation. The man who says "I do
not know" with his mouth declares with, his life the opposite.
Thus, the agnostic is not neutral, as he proclaims to be. This
aspect of secularism will be explored more fully in the next
section.
48. Id.
49. See United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931). In his
dissent, with which Justices Stone, Holmes, and Brandeis agreed, Justice
Hughes wrote, "[T]he essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involv-
ing duties superior to those arising from any human relation." Id.
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C. Exclusivity of Truth
To accommodate a pluralistic society, the secularist believes
to have adopted an epistemological pluralism. The secularist
does not desire to be dogmatic, therefore he emphasizes the
non-exclusivity of truth. In A Theory ofJustice, legal theorist John
Rawls argued that a democracy should reason according to, as it
were, the least common denominator. That is, democracy
should act on "reasoning acceptable to all .... [D] eparture from
generally recognized ways of reasoning would involve a privi-
leged place for the views of some over others...50
Michael McConnell has accurately noted, however, that sec-
ular liberalism, though purporting not to take sides, does indeed
take sides. 5' The very fact that it offers particular reasons and
draws on cultural resources aligns it with a particular moral tradi-
tion, making it "appear to be parochial or sectarian from other
points of view. ' ' 52 It is simply not possible for secularism to incul-
cate public virtue without compromising its commitment to neu-
trality.53 "Somehow, 'neutral' came to mean 'secular'-as if
agnosticism about the theistic foundations of the universe were
common ground among believers and nonbelievers alike. 54
Regretfully for the secularist, truth dies hard. Truth is nec-
essarily exclusive. The one who claims that secularism is true has
already rejected out of hand all non-secular worldviews. The sec-
ularist may claim all religions are equally true in the hope of
reducing conflict and furthering tolerance, but not only is this
claim self-contradictory, it implicitly rejects the truth of all non-
secular worldviews. Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism,
Santeria, Satanism, Pantheism, and any number of religions posit
one exclusive view of the world. Even the Buddhist' teaching
that "all is one" is a claim for the truth of Buddhism and the
rejection of any religion that does not claim "all is one."
One might say one's eyes are green, and might even wish
very much they were. But saying one's eyes are green will not
change the fact that they are brown. The secularist might claim
that secularism can accommodate all worldviews, and he might
even wish this were the case. But religions present competing
truth claims that secularism implicitly rejects. Thus, contrary to
50. JOHN RAwxvs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 213 (1971).
51. Michael McConnell, The New Establishmentarianism, 75 CHi.-KErNr L.
REV. 453 (2000).
52. Id. at 455.
53. Id.
54. Michael W. McConnell, "God Is Dead and We Have Killed Him!.": Freedom
of Religion in the Postmodern Age, 1993 BYU L. REx. 163, 174.
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common opinion, secularism does not and cannot accommodate
all worldviews.
Louis Seidman correctly observed that the distinction
between the public and the private sphere (and thus the secular
and the religious) is not a self-evident, natural ordering, but
rather "a human construct that must be fought for and quarreled
over."55 Bruce Ackerman has argued that citizens should discuss
public policy based on shared moral premises that both sides
find reasonable.56 However, the shortcoming of this argument is
obvious: it assumes that all worldviews share basic moral prem-
ises.57 It may be true that many worldviews share basic moral
premises, but in a diverse political and moral body, some
worldviews may not meet on any level at all.58
Even if some moral precepts are shared, worldviews with dif-
ferent underlying presuppositions approach such moral issues
from fundamentally different angles. Therefore, common moral
premises are usually shared in only a superficial sense. "When
[secularism] tries to square the circle, the result is a thin, least-
common-denominator version of public virtue... ."" Bruce Ack-
erman's approach is correct for prudential reasons, since discuss-
ing public policy in a language accessible to most will win more
people. His argument, however, is rooted not in prudence, but
in the inherently biased premise that non-religious reasoning is
the only way to conduct public debate. Perry has correctly noted
that "Ackerman is obviously privileging particular premises or
beliefs."'60
At bottom, the secularist applies his own value preferences
by choosing and excluding types of political language according
to his view of the world. The secularist, like the non-secularist,
cannot escape the fact that he believes his own worldview is the
most accurate description of the world. He believes his
worldview, to the exclusion of others, is true. "Ultimately, then,
the only reason to exclude religious views from the realm of coer-
cive public policy ... is because those views are wrong."61 Secu-
larism is, in the end, a value-laden view of the world no less than
is Christianity, Judaism, or any other traditionally recognized
religion.
55. Louis M. Seidman, Public Principle and Private Choice: The Uneasy Case
for a Boundary Maintenance Theory of Constitutional Law, 96 YALE L.j. 1006 (1987).
56. Bruce Ackermen, Why Dialogue?, 86J. PHILOSOPHY 5, 17-18 (1989).
57. PERRY, supra note 2, at 9.
58. Id.
59. McConnell, supra note 51, at 455.
60. PERRY, supra note 2, at 10.
61. Alexander, supra note 32, at 797.
EPISTEMOLOGICAL NONSENSE?
Kathleen Sullivan concedes this point.62 She argues that
even though secularism has its own substantive content and con-
flicts with religious worldviews, this conflict is inevitable. Under
our Constitution, she argues, secularism is the only viable option
in a liberal democracy. She fears that allowing religious thought
to invade the public square would result in strife, therefore it is
safer for religion to remain a private affair.63
Fear of strife, however, is not enough to bar an issue from
the public square. "If avoidance of strife were an independent
constitutional value, no legislation could be adopted on any sub-
ject which aroused strong and divided feelings."64 Race relations
continue to engender a great deal of strife, but the nation
believes the issue is important enough to maintain in political
discourse.6 5 In fact, strife erupts over tax increases, antitrust
jurisprudence, oil drilling, and censorship. Sullivan's argument
that secularism should prevail because of fear of division is simply
not compelling.
Indeed, Sullivan seems to have it backwards. Our Constitu-
tion never intended secularism to prevail over all other
worldviews, come what may. Rather, our Constitution guarantees
nearly any idea, inane or radical, honorable or blasphemous, an
equal place in public discourse. In Lemon v. Kurtzman,66 the
Supreme Court grappled with this idea in holding two state stat-
utes to be unconstitutional. Both statutes provided state aid to
religious schools, and the Court set up a three-part test to deter-
mine whether or not religion had been established. First, the law
had to serve a secular purpose; second, the law could neither
advance nor inhibit religion; and finally, the law could not result
in excessive government entanglement with religion.6 v One of
the factors weighed in considering the entanglement prong was
62. See Kathleen Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REv.
195 (1992).
63. Id. at 197.
64. Alan Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause Value,
77 YALE L.J. 692, 711 (1968).
65. Id. See also Justice Scalia's concurrence in Good News Club v. Milford
School, 533 U.S. 98, 126 (2000), in which he argues that a Christian Bible group
should have the freedom to access a public school "even if ... its actions may
prove (shudder!) divisive." See also justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 689 (1984), in which she states that "political divisiveness
along religious lines should not be an independent test of constitutionality....
[W]e have never relied on divisiveness as an independent ground for holding a
government practice unconstitutional."
66. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
67. Id. at 612.
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the potential for political divisiveness.68 Chief Justice Burger, in
a surprising statement, wrote that "many people confronted with
[public religious] issues.., will find their votes aligned with their
faith. 69 As if this were a bad or unusual thing! As if faith were
the one aspect of voters' lives that must be suppressed at the bal-
lot box! Chief Justice Burger even went so far as to say that the
First Amendment was intended to protect from political division
along religious lines.7v
This view has been roundly criticized.71 It entirely misses
the point, expressed by James Madison, that contending factions
in politics-including religious factions-safeguard against the
possibility of one faction gaining a tyrannical stronghold.72 This
is done through the many disparate voices of the democratic pro-
cess, as voices vie with one another and eventually balance each
other out. This is precisely the point of democracy as set up
under our Constitution-not to force a secular straitjacket on
the political process, as Sullivan or Chief Justice Burger seem to
contend, but rather to allow every voice, religious and irreligious,
into public debate.
Kent Greenawalt, however, would rather legislation and pub-
lic policy not be motivated by religious convictions. "[A] liberal
society should not rely on religious grounds to prohibit activities
that either cause no secular harm or do not cause enough secu-
lar harm to warrant their prohibition."73 However, that is no
more than to say that citizens must suppress their religious con-
victions at the ballot box. One wonders whether this is the way
democracy should work-by marginalizing religiously-based
motivations in favor of an illusory secular neutrality. This version
of "neutrality" seems no more than a thinly veiled hostility
towards religion.
Perry proposes that, "Because of the role that religious argu-
ments about the morality of human conduct inevitably play in
the political process, it is important that such arguments, no less
than secular moral arguments, be presented in-so that they can
68. Id. at 622.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., Edward M. Gaffney, Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines:
The Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 205 (1980).
72. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 51 (James Madison).
73. KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 91
(1988).
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be tested in-public political debate."74 This seems right. As
mentioned above, all ideas, religious and secular alike, should be
tested in the waters of public opinion. The purpose of the politi-
cal process is to allow all voices to be heard, and to allow citizens
to vote according to their own idiosyncratic motives. Legislators,
though required to faithfully represent their constituents (for
reasons of prudence), should have the same freedom to act from
idiosyncratic motives.
As illustration, suppose a legislator were to include in his re-
election campaign the proposal to add an amendment to the
Constitution requiring all highway signs to be changed from
green to pink, and he declared that an alien told him to do so.
His ability to publicly use such reasoning is altogether distinct
from his ability to get votes. Let's suppose a contingent of alien
worshippers whose favorite color is pink re-elects him. His pro-
posal would still have to meet the approval of the House, the
Senate, and the President. If the House, the Senate, or the Presi-
dent thinks the proposal absurd (as one assumes they might), the
measure would never see daylight. The same applies to any
"religious" argument in public discourse. If the reasoning is
found to be distasteful to the people, it will not stand.
One might then ask, what if this absurd proposal were to
appeal to a majority in the House, a majority in the Senate, and
signed into law by the President? Then it still must pass the test
of the courts, which will strike down the law if it is seen as an
establishment of religion. The hurdles that any bill-much less a
religiously motivated one-must jump are steep. As this nation
has moved away from its generally theistic roots75 towards a more
pluralistic society, religiously motivated laws are even more inher-
ently suspect than they may have been at the founding. The fact
is "religious" tyranny is simply not a realistic possibility under our
Constitution.
Justice Brennan's concurrence in McDaniel v. Paty,76 a case
upholding the right of clergy to participate as legislators,
presents an apt perspective on religious participation in the pub-
lic square:
The mere fact that a purpose of the Establishment Clause
is to reduce or eliminate religious divisiveness or strife,
does not place religious discussion, association, or political
74. MICHAELJ. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL
PERSPECTIVES 61 (1997).
75. John Witte, Jr., The Theology and Politics of the First Amendment Religion
Clauses: A Bicentennial Essay, 40 EMORY L.J. 489 (1991).
76. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
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participation in a status less preferred than rights of discus-
sion, association, and political participation generally....
In short, government may not as a goal promote "safe
thinking" with respect to religion and fence out from polit-
ical participation those, such as ministers, whom it regards
as overinvolved in religion. Religionists no less than mem-
bers of any other group enjoy the full measure of protec-
tion afforded speech, association, and political activity
generally.
7 7
Justice Scalia elsewhere writes:
Our cases in no way imply that the Establishment Clause
forbids legislators merely to act upon their religious convic-
tions. We surely would not strike down a law providing
money to feed the hungry or shelter the homeless if it
could be demonstrated that, but for the religious beliefs of
the legislators, the funds would not have been approved.
Also, political activism by the religiously motivated is part
of our heritage .... [We may not] deprive religious men
and women of their right to participate in the political pro-
cess. Today's religious activism may give us the Balanced
Treatment Act, but yesterday's resulted in the abolition of
slavery, and tomorrow's may bring relief for famine
victims.
7 8
Strife may indeed arise from introducing the "religious" into
public debate-but as indicated earlier, strife erupts over tax
increases, antitrust jurisprudence, oil drilling, racial integration,
and censorship. Religious reasoning has played a broad role in
our national history and politics, and religious motives have
undergirded great social movements. Religion should not only
be allowed in public debate-it is vital to public debate.
D. Summary
The purpose of this study has been to demonstrate that an
element of irrationality exists in every conceptual scheme, such
that neutrality and complete rationality are impossible ideals.
We have by now established the irrefutable fact that faith in some
authority lies beneath all thinking and acting. No epistemologi-
cal system is exempt. At bottom, the skeptic, the agnostic, and
the naturalist depend on improvable, unquestionable axioms no
less than the most ardent theist. Neutrality is an impossible ideal
for the secularist, who approaches the world with his own non-
77. Id. at 640-41.
78. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 615 (1987).
EPISTEMOLOGICAL NONSENSE?
neutral framework of interpretation. The secularist may not
claim lack of dogmatism, for he posits his own firmly entrenched
beliefs about the nature of the universe, to the exclusion of other
non-secularist claims to the contrary.
II. THE SUPREME COURT
There has been a recent trend in the Supreme Court consis-
tent with this Note's argument. Rather than placing "religion" in
a special and distinct realm, out of bounds to a secular govern-
ment, the Court has cut away at separationism in favor of a more
"neutral" approach towards all viewpoints. Note that this recent
approach is not premised on neutrality, though couched in such
terms, but rather on the understanding that secularism and relig-
ion are not so different after all. Both categories espouse their
own values, and the Court should treat each value system equally,
rather than giving "secularism" a stronghold in the government
while marginalizing religion.
Although Establishment Clause jurisprudence by no means
provides a straight and clear path, there are some discernible
trends. In the area of public school education, earlier cases
found Establishment Clause violations where state aid directly
went to support parochial schools, or where religious instruction
involved the direct use of government property. 79 More recent
cases, however, have shifted the focus away from direct govern-
ment aid to state aid offered neutrally to public and parochial
schools alike.8"
79. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (holding that use of
public school teachers in parochial schools involves excessive entanglement
between church and state); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985)
(striking down shared time program as violation of Establishment Clause);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (holding that reimbursement for sala-
ries and teaching materials in religious schools is unconstitutional); Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding released time program only insofar as
religious instruction took place off of public school grounds); McCollum v.
Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (striking down released time program
where religious instruction took place on public school property).
80. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (upholding as consti-
tutional therapeutic services on public school grounds and state provision of
instructional materials); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (upholding
remedial services on public school grounds as constitutional); Zobrest v. Cata-
lina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (allowing sign-language interpreter
for deaf student on premises of religious school); Witters v. Washington Dep't
of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (upholding state grant to blind man
to use towards religious education); for the argument that "strict separationism"
no longer exists, see Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 230 (1994).
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In the significant case Lemon v. Kurtzman,8 Rhode Island
and Pennsylvania statutes allocating direct funding to private
schools were challenged as violating the Establishment Clause.
The Rhode Island statute authorized the state to supplement the
salaries of private school teachers who taught secular courses, in
an amount not in excess of 15% of their annual salaries. The
Pennsylvania statute authorized reimbursement of private
schools for their actual expenditures involving secular subjects.
The Court proposed a three-part test to determine whether
the statutes in question violated the Establishment Clause. "First,
the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an exces-
sive entanglement with religion."' Focusing primarily on the
third prong of the test, the Court struck down the statutes as vio-
lating the Establishment Clause. 2 The Court seemed worried
about the possibility of the state using parochial school teachers
to teach secular subjects, as the teachers might inadvertently
inculcate religious beliefs while teaching. Additionally, Penn-
sylvania's program of reimbursement involved government moni-
toring and surveillance in the allocation of state aid for only
secular teaching materials.8 3
Lynch v. Donnelly84 held that displaying a Nativity scene on
public grounds was constitutional. "The Constitution does not
require complete separation of church and state; it affirmatively
mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions,
and forbids hostility toward any."8 5 In her concurrence, Justice
O'Connor first formulated her endorsement test, reasoning that
the issue should revolve around whether or not the government,
by its actions, had given the impression of endorsing religion. 6
Since the government had merely intended to celebrate a cul-
tural holiday rather than preach about the birth of Christ, it had
not endorsed Christianity.87
Although government aid directly helping religious schools
was once ruled as a violation of the nonestablishment doctrine,8 8
81. 403 U.S. at 602.
82. Id. at 614, 623.
83. Id. at 613.
84. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). But see County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater
Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
85. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 668.
86. Id. at 690.
87. Id. at 691.
88. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball,
473 U.S. 373 (1985).
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the Court rejected this reasoning in Agostini v. Felton. 9 The key
to constitutionality rested on the neutral application of the law in
question.9 ° It no longer mattered whether state aid directly
helped religion, as long as private choice was posited between
the state grant and the payment of private education.9 '
This same reasoning was taken much farther in Mitchell v.
Helms, 2 which involved government aid issued direcly to private
schools on the basis of neutral criteria. Funds were disbursed on
a per capita basis to public and private schools alike. About
thirty percent of the funds were allocated to private schools, and
of these private schools, the overwhelming majority were relig-
ious in nature. Thus, unlike previous cases, in which private
actors directed aid to the school of their choice, this program
involved direct government aid to parochial schools. Justice
Thomas, writing for the Court, held that the program's neutral
criteria saved the program from violating the Constitution.9" "If
a program offers permissible aid to the religious . . . .the are-
ligious, and the irreligious, it is a mystery which view of religion
the government has established, and thus a mystery what the con-
stitutional violation would be."9 4 In fact, Justice Thomas criti-
cized the dissent for its "special hostility" towards religion.
9 5
The principle of neutrality also manifests itself in a line of
cases implicating the Free Speech Clause. In Widmar v. Vincent,96
the Court invalidated on free speech grounds a state university
regulation prohibiting student use of school facilities for relig-
ious purposes. An "equal access" policy was adopted that the
Court found consistent with Lemon.9 7 This reasoning holds that,
as long as a forum has been created for students to discuss ideas,
then all ideas must have equal access to that forum-including
religious ideas.9 8 To bar religious groups from using the limited
public forum was to discriminate against their viewpoint, which is
a violation of the constitutional right to free speech. 99
The doctrine of Widmar was later extended to secondary
schools in Board of Education of the Westside Community Schools v.
89. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
90. Id. at 230-32.
91. Id. at 226.
92. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
93. Id. at 809.
94. Id. at 827.
95. Id.
96. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
97. Id. at 271.
98. Id. at 277.
99. Id.
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Mergens, 0° despite the fact that it involved younger, more impres-
sionable schoolchildren. Justice O'Connor wrote that equal
access gave the message of neutrality, as all groups regardless of
viewpoint should be allowed to participate in a limited public
forum.101
This doctrine received further support in Lamb's Chapel v.
Center Moriches Union Free School District.'°2 In this case, the con-
tent of a film discussing childrearing from a Christian perspec-
tive was at issue. The Court held that the Establishment Clause
would not be violated by showing the film on public school
grounds after hours, but rather the school violated the church's
right to free speech by discriminating against its Christian view-
point.' ' The Court reasoned that it would be manifestly unfair
for the school to permit the screening of any film discussing chil-
drearing from any perspective, while barring a religious perspec-
tive.'0 4 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia °5
followed on the heels of Lamb's Chapel by holding that a state
university engaged in viewpoint discrimination by denying funds
to a Christian student magazine. 10 6 Once it provided a limited
public forum, the university should have distributed its funds
evenly to all student magazines, rather than singling out the
Christian magazine because of its religious content. 'By doing
so, the university violated the students' right to free speech.'0 7
This "equal access" approach appeared again in Good News
Club v. Milford Central School.'0 8 A public school denied access to a
Christian group, which had requested permission to use a class-
room after hours to conduct a bible study. The Supreme Court
held that Milford was a limited public forum self-professedly
open to activities "pertaining to the welfare of the commu-
nity," "' and the Good News Club involved teachings pertaining
to the welfare of the community." 0 "[N]o one disputes that the
Club instructs children to overcome feelings of jealousy, to treat
others well regardless of how they treat the children, and to be
obedient, even if it does so in a nonsecular way.""' Therefore,
100. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
101. Id. at 248.
102. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
103. Id. at 393-95.
104. Id.
105. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
106. Id. at 831.
107. Id. at 839.
108. 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
109. Id. at 108.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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the Court held Milford School had engaged in viewpoint discrim-
ination against the Good News Club." 12
Returning to Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the neu-
trality framework was reinforced most recently in Zelman v. Sim-
mons-Harris."' Ohio taxpayers challenged a school vouchers
program as a violation of the Establishment Clause. The Court
ruled that, because the aid was distributed neutrally, and any gov-
ernment aid received by religious schools was the result of par-
ents' private choice, the vouchers program did not violate the
First Amendment." 4 The Court found it irrelevant that ninety-
six percent of aid recipients attended religiously affiliated
schools." 5 "The constitutionality of a neutral educational aid
program simply does not turn on whether and why, in a particu-
lar area, at a particular time, most private schools are run by
religious organizations, or most recipients choose to use the aid
at a religious school."' 16
This string of Free Speech and Establishment Clause cases
reveals a gradual tendency of the Court toward requiring govern-
ment neutrality towards religion. In the free speech context, the
government may not discriminate according to viewpoint by
allowing secular organizations access to public facilities while
denying access to limited public fora. In the Establishment
Clause context, the government may allow parents the option of
spending government aid on religious schools," 7 or even grant
aid directly to parochial schools on a neutral, per capita basis." 8
In the one setting, the government is required to provide equal
access to religious and secular viewpoints alike. In the other, the
government is allowed to provide funding for both religious and
secular schools." 9 But in both settings, the Court has demon-
strated the gradual recognition that secularism, once believed to
hold the high ground in the public square, can no longer have
such priority. This arises from one significant fact: secularism
espouses its own particular viewpoint, its own unique morality,
and its own non-neutral value judgments. The Court (or at least
112. Id. at 109.
113. 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002).
114. Id. at 2467-68.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
119. It is yet to be seen whether the First Amendment requires the gov-
ernment to provide aid to religious believers, although at least one case has
held that it does as to state educational scholarships. See Davey v. Locke, 299
F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002).
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some members of it) has thus come to realize that secularism is
no less neutral than religion.
In his concurrence in Good News Club, Justice Scalia sets forth
this reasoning lucidly:
1 20
From no other group does respondent require the sterility
of speech that it demands of petitioners. The Boy Scouts
could undoubtedly buttress their exhortations to keep
"morally straight" and live "clean" lives by giving [secular]
reasons why that is a good idea-because parents want and
expect it, because it will make the scouts "better" and
"more successful" people, because it will emulate such
admired past Scouts as former President Gerald Ford. The
Club, however, may only discuss morals and character, and
cannot give its reasons why they should be fostered-
because God wants and expects it, because it will make the
Club members "saintly" people, and because it emulates
Jesus Christ.... This is blatant viewpoint discrimination.
Just as calls to character based on patriotism will go unan-
swered if the listeners do not believe their country is good
and just, calls to moral behavior based on God's will are
useless if the listeners do not believe that God exists. Effec-
tiveness in presenting a viewpoint rests on the persuasive-
ness with which the speaker defends his premise-and in
respondent's facilities every premise but a religious one
may be defended. 2 1
Justice Scalia's reasoning reveals a position entirely consis-
tent with the analysis of this Note. That is, that secularism
involves its own non-neutral value judgments, as does religion,
and to exclude the latter is to prefer the former. This is an unjus-
tified preference.
III. "RELIGION"
After his demonstration of the ultimate irrationality of dif-
ferent worldviews, Wittgenstein cynically concluded that each
person's bedrock assumptions are at best arbitrary, at worst, thor-
oughly biased. In the end, we can only opine, and "[w] here two
principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with one
another, then each man declares the other a fool and heretic. ' '122
120. 533 U.S. 98, 120-27 (2001).
121. Id. at 124-25 (citations omitted).
122. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 25, § 611.
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"At the end of reasons comes persuasion."1 23 At bottom, no single
true philosophy exists, only different therapies.
1 24
This conclusion is not terribly helpful in determining a
more accurate First Amendment jurisprudence. This Note, how-
ever, does not agree with such a conclusion. It is an unjustified
leap to infer from the presence of a multitude of worldviews that
no Truth therefore exists. The former need not imply the latter.
In fact, such a stance is logically inconsistent and self-contradic-
tory. To say, "No viewpoint is ultimately true," is to assert a view-
point the speaker believes is ultimately true. Apart from its
logical contradiction, the theory is unworkable in real life. Every
person lives as though he believes in something, even if he says he
believes in nothing.
Truth necessarily exists. But one may admit that without
admitting that we, as finite, limited human beings, are capable of
grasping Truth. Nietzsche's perspectivalism is grounded in the
notion that our spatial and temporal restrictions only allow us
very limited perspectives of the world. Even if Truth exists, mor-
tal man is unable to grasp it, for to grasp Truth is to transcend
space and time to discern the eternal, the immutable, the abso-
lute-and this mortals cannot do.
Of course, Nietzsche never considered the possibility (which
would no doubt seem absurd to him) that Truth itself might
come and reveal itself to mankind. In other words, despite man's
limited and finite nature, man might still be able to grasp abso-
lute Truth through its being affirmatively revealed to him. This
is a perfectly logical possibility, and to reject it outright is to have
presupposed the nonexistence of absolute Truth in the first
place-or at least to presuppose that absolute Truth cannot
affirmatively reveal itself to mankind. However, it is just this pos-
sibility that religious traditions allow, particularly those that
believe in the personal interaction of God (i.e., Absolute Truth)
with mankind.
Conceding that Truth necessarily exists, the hard question is
determining what, exactly, Truth is. And it is this question that
public discourse should be allowed to determine, through its
myriad political and legal channels, known to us as the demo-
cratic process. And yet, votes may only go so far, for at some
point, the will of the majority must confront that colossal, ever-
watchful guardian of rights-the Constitution. This is why the
role of the legislator differs markedly from the role of the judge.
123. Id. § 612.
124. LUDWIG WIrrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 133
(G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1953).
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It is not the judge's task, as prescribed in our Constitution, to
determine popular opinion, but rather to apply the law. The
judge, however, is not exempt from value judgments any more
than the legislator, and so determining how to apply the estab-
lishment and free exercise clauses without violating them seems
to pose a not insignificant problem. For the Court to decide
between what is "religious" and what is not is for the Court inevi-
tably to prefer certain worldviews, with their inherent value sys-
tems, to others. This is a fundamentally moral process of
decision-making.
And it is this that the Court does, although masking it
behind terms like "neutrality," "endorsement," "secularism," and
"religion." If value preferences are inevitable, even in the appli-
cation of law in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and if the
secular/religious distinction is epistemologically incoherent,
then are we at a crossroads? What is the judge's proper role
here? For it is all fine and good to theoretically dismantle the
secular/religious distinction, but one is still left with what courts
are to do about it. Should one cast aside the distinction as irrele-
vant, in favor of postmodern disillusionment over establishing a
coherent and principled approach to Establishment Clause juris-
prudence? Or should one retain the distinction and work with it
as best one can, defining as clearly as possible the terms
employed? In answering this question, an illustration from
another field of law can provide some insight.
For purposes of appellate review of lower court decisions,
academics have long criticized the fact/law distinction as one
that breaks down easily upon examination. Neat categorization
fails when certain issues can be classified as either fact or law.
However, Gary Lawson makes the insightful remark that this
fact/law distinction, "which every sophisticated academic will tell
you is a naive misconception, happens to be embodied in the
United States Constitution .... ,,125 And if one takes the Constitu-
tion seriously, as this Note certainly does, then one must work
with the terms it has given us. Thus, the answer to the question
posed above is given by the latter position: though the secular/
religious distinction seems epistemologically incoherent, the
terms are employed in our Constitution, statutes, and all of our
Supreme Court jurisprudence. Therefore we have no choice but
125. GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 504 (2d ed. 2001) (cit-
ing U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law, where the value in con-
troversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.") (emphasis
added)).
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to make the distinction as coherent as possible. The way to do
this, this Note proposes, is to define the terms clearly, and then
apply them consistently.
It is precisely this that the Court has not done. Our Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence is yet to define exactly what relig-
ion and secularism are, and this is its greatest weakness. It is not
enough to formulate a three-part test to determine whether a law
establishes religion. If the terms employed within that test are
undefined, then the Court will not know what is being advanced
or inhibited, or what the purpose of the law in question really is.
Some artificial line-drawing may be inevitable, and where the
lines fall may even seem arbitrary-but the point is to lay down
clear parameters that can be applied in a principled way. The
inherent difficulties in line-drawing are nowhere near as prob-
lematic as the application of terms undefined and easily
manipulable.
Although an artificial rigidity may result from the definitions
set, and such artifice may appear unfair to the common litigant,
the alternative results in far more injustice. Failing to define the
terms leaves them unacceptably vague, and dangerously mallea-
ble. Each justice no doubt has his or her own notions as to what
counts as religion, and what counts as secularism. But those
notions remain confused and unexpressed. Judges always have
the duty to explain the rationale behind their holdings.
Although the Court has tried to do so in its Establishment Clause
cases, it has failed to take it one step farther, not defining the
very terms on which all else hangs.
With this goal in mind, we will be saved-it is hoped-from
future footnotes like that of Justice Black's in Torcaso v. Wat-
kins,'26 practically equating secularism with religion-neither
helpful nor clarifying. Other cases in which the terms are notori-
ously stretched include those dealing with conscientious objec-
tors. The Selective Service Act of 1940 required that a
conscientious objector be exempted from armed service if his
religious convictions informed him so.' 2 7 In United States v. See-
ger,128 several conscientious objectors were denied exemption
126. 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961) ("Among religions in this country...
are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism, and others."
(emphasis added)).
127. Pub. L. No. 76-783, 54 Stat. 885, 889 (1940). The statute provides in
relevant part, "Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to require any
person to be subject to combatant training and service in the land or naval
forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is
conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form."
128. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
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due to their lack of belief in traditional religion. On appeal, the
Supreme Court reversed, allowing exemptions for each appel-
lant. Religion, the Court found, is comprised of diverse strands
of thought, and need not require belief in a personal God.' 29
Quoting the theologian Paul Tillich,"'3 religion could include
any belief "you take seriously without any reservation."'"' On
such a definition, it would be difficult to exclude any worldviews.
Another source cited in the opinion defined religion as "the
supreme expression of human nature; it is man thinking his
highest, feeling his deepest, and living his best." '132 "A sincere
and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a
place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly quali-
fying for the exemption comes within the statutory definition." '33
"Religion" thus becomes a morass of any conceivable belief, as
long as it is firmly held.
Five years later in Welsh v. United States, the Supreme Court
followed Seeger by reaffirming the breadth "religion" implies.'
In a patronizing gesture, the Court offered that the registrant
who listed himself as nonreligious on his Selective Service System
form might really be religious, but just not know it.'3 5 The Court
distinguished between beliefs resting on religious grounds as
within the scope of the statute, versus beliefs that rest on "philo-
sophical" grounds.136 The Court failed to explain the difference
between what counts as "religious" and what counts as "philo-
sophical." Any person minimally schooled in basic philosophy
understands, however, that philosophy is simply another word
for worldview-and "worldview" includes religion.
The truths of philosophy, it should be said, are not
restricted only to the sometimes ephemeral teachings of
professional philosophers. All men and women . . . are in
some sense philosophers and have their own philosophical
conceptions with which they direct their lives. In one way
or other, they shape a comprehensive vision and an answer
to the question of life's meaning, and in the light of this
129. Id. at 176.
130. Generally regarded as more liberal than conservative among
theologians.
131. PAUL TILLICH, THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATIONS 57 (1948), cited in
Seeger, 380 U.S. at 180.
132. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 169.
133. Id. at 176.
134. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
135. Id. at 341.
136. Id. at 343.
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they interpret their own life's course and regulate their
behavior. 1
37
In his concurrence, Justice Harlan sharply criticized this
aspect of the opinion. "The prevailing opinion today . . .has
performed a lobotomy and completely transformed the statute
by reading out of it any distinction between religiously acquired
beliefs and those deriving from 'essentially political, sociological,
or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code."" 3 8
And later:
Unless we are to assume an Alice-in-Wonderland world
where words have no meaning, I think it fair to say that
Congress' choice of language cannot fail to convey to the
discerning reader the very policy choice that the prevailing
opinion today completely obliterates: that between conven-
tional religions that usually have an organized and formal
structure [and] .. .loose and informal associations of indi-
viduals who share common ethical, moral, or intellectual
views. 139
These cases set the precedent for defining religion
extremely broadly, such that there is essentially little conceptual
difference between secularism and religion. In order for any
meaningful distinction to exist between the two, the Court must
undertake the task of defining secularism and religion. It may be
that "religion" must be limited in ways that seem artificial-for
instance, religion may be restricted to include only those tradi-
tions that worship a Supreme Being. This automatically excludes
Buddhism or Humanism, and this is problematic. However, the
alternative seems worse, which is to do precisely what was done in
Welsh and Seeger, and what is being done today-to allow "relig-
ion" to mean a hotchpotch of traditions espousing any deeply
held beliefs. Defining the parameters is the only way to ensure a
clearer, more principled Establishment Clause jurisprudence
On a different note, the Court's jurisprudence in this area,
consistent with the analysis in this Note, is at least somewhat
promising. Lamb's Chapel, Good News Club, and Zelman reveal a
trend towards placing religion on an equal footing with secular-
ism. Implicit in this move is the knowledge (conscious or not)
that all worldviews-not simply "religious" ones-involve value
preferences. Therefore, to exclude religiously-based reasoning
from public discourse while allowing secularly-based justifications
to stand is to discriminate unreasonably. Whether or not the
137. JOHN PAUL II, supra note 20, at 43.
138. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 351.
139. Id. at 354.
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Court will attempt a redefinition of secularism and religion is
unclear. But at least the recent trend away from "strict separa-
tionism" towards equal access is more consistent with proper
epistemological analysis.
